If settler colonies are driven by the impulse of destroying to replace, what was destroyed and how was it replaced in Algeria? This article shows how an Islamic state of being was replaced by the being of the state in the 1830s and the '40s; a transformation largely achieved through complementary strategies of spectacular and slow violence, ranging from annihilatory massacres to the seizure of the productive capacity of peoples and their lands. By listening attentively to indigenous writers such as Hamdan Khodja and Ahmed Bey, alongside the banal details of the making of empire found in archival documents, a new picture of the development of 'Algeria' emerges, along with its significance in world history. This essay argues that while one form of state was destroyed in Algeria over the period 1830-47 -between the Conquest and the push south to the Sahara -it was replaced by a new form of life of world historical significance. Indeed, this act of destruction and that which was destroyed were also of global importance. The new state was founded on two understandings and praxes of violence: first, the spectacular violence of immediacy which was designed to destroy people, Curiously, we pay more attention to these historical failures than we do to the world historical success of France in Algeria. Napoleon, after all, was expelled from Egypt, just as he was from Prussia. He may have inaugurated the End of History, but he was succeeded by autocrats who staved off democratic destiny for many decades. 
plurality and interdependence of forms of annihilation when he coined the term 'genocide'. 11 ' The logic of elimination', Wolfe writes, 'not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that', for it also includes those forms of slow and structural violence which induce 'the dissolution of native societies'. 12 Such social goals are predicated on the distinctness of settler colonies in that 'settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.' 13 This sense of the structural violence of the Algerian case was famously explored in a twentieth-century context by Frantz Fanon 14 , while Abdelmajid Hannoum's work extends such analysis to the nineteenth century (from 1847 onwards), arguing that the Algerian experience reveals that 'the discourse of modernity itself inflicts and creates the conditions of violence'. 15 Unlike
Hannoum, however, this essay has little interest in the textuality of violence or the means by which it was countenanced in cultural production (the chief sources for Hannoum's project), for, by 1847 16 , much of the programme of violent displacement had been accomplished in Algeria. At times it had been theorised on the published page, but it is the private records of the fabric of local encounters and exchanges between metropolitan and colonial power which reveal the empirical and programmatic extent of the destruction of indigenous cultures. 17 To a unique degree amongst settler colonies, Algeria was settled by soldiers and militarily defined as a polity.
What the reports, letters and marginalia of the archival record reveal is that Hannoum's description of modernity as being a French export to Algeria 18 misses the degree to which modernity was made in the colony, or in interchanges between the two places. 19 Similarly, modernity did not create new forms of violence; rather, novel forms of violence were constitutive of the stitching of modernity. 20 Murray-Miller's notion that modernity was instead constructed across the Mediterranean rings truer, whilst a great deal of work remains to be done on detailing and unpicking the continuities in the politics, ideology and, most importantly, practice of violence in French warring at home during the Revolution, abroad in wars such as those fought on the Iberian peninsula, and further afield in colonies such as Algeria and Nouvelle Calédonie. 21 6 Mark Levene's claim that the massacres of the Vendée in 1790s were not only the archetypal modern genocide, but also integral to a new form of nation-building, points to the interlocking and productive character of new forms of ideology and violence at this time (alongside Schama's stress on the relationship between violence and new understandings of citizenship). 22 Similarly, David Bell's contention that the Napoleonic campaigns marked the advent of 'total war' again established French primacy in the marriage of novel forms of conflict with fundamentally new relationships of power between nations and citizens. 23 It was in such environments that the architects of the Algerian policy were schooled in the creative capacity of modes of violence which targeted societies and the environments which supported them; comprehending the political efficacy of strangling indigenous forms of life and the dreams which could be built in such spaces.
'A new Peru'
Contemporaneous French sources can never be relied on to describe how their Conquest affected Algerians 24 , for while they provided many answers to this question, they did not know what they were destroying. They had not been in and of the place. Those who had, such as the indigenous writers Hamdan Khodja and Ahmed, Bey of Constantine, are the guides to whom we should turn to learn what was obliterated, how it was replaced and what effects it had on local peoples. Listened to attentively, we learn that in imposing a new form of governance upon an evolving Algerian spacethe nation state -colonists destroyed an existing polity and society. In a sense, the historical underestimation of the scale of this loss of ways of life has come about precisely because the French programme of destruction in Algeria was not as completely annihilatory as, say, the settler colonial experience in America or Australia. Algerians remained a numeric majority in their own land throughout the colonial period and from the last decades of the nineteenth century onwards they were able to reconstitute indigenous societies from subaltern positions. Nonetheless, in the 1830s 31 Thus, as Khodja had also underscored, while individual massacres mattered, it was critical to see that the progressive project of destruction was grounded in forms of slow and structural violence which sought to annihilate the culture of the living as much as that of the dead.
The point of origin of almost all writing on the early Algerian colony has tended to be its creative capacity and the narrative of its testing coming-into-being 32 , whereas a study which begins with Ahmed Bey or Hamdan Khodja starts from a position of prizing the narrative importance of that which was destroyed as much as that was built upon its ruins and ashes. Crucially, Ahmed Bey described the interlocking of spectacular, immediate violence with forms of slower, more structural assaults on indigenous life: the destruction of houses, the seizure of land and the dismantling of the lived culture of justice embodied in waqf institutions. The concept of destroying to replace is most plain in his account of the confiscation of mosques in order to rent them to traders, for as a pillar of life was removed, it was replaced by a form of economic profiteering and control which underwrote the costs of occupation and acted to dismantle the autonomy of indigenous economic actors. And given that forms of autonomy were attacked in Algeria, it was unsurprising that much of the fiercest resistance the French faced came from those Kabyles whose self-identity was predicated on the notion that they were 'free men' (Amazigh or Imazighen).
33
That which was destroyed also merits being described as a state, though it was not of course drawn along the same lines as the modern European nation state. Instead, the Algerian 34 state was spatially complex in the sense that it accommodated local power and governance within an overarching imperial frame, underwritten by shared religious sensibilities and culture (temporally assured by God). Nowhere was this more obvious than in the figure of Ahmed Bey, a kouloughli creole, born of a Turkish father and a Maghrebi mother, whose later years were dominated by his appeals to Istanbul on behalf of his co-religionists in Constantine, whom he governed and to whom he belonged. This state was grounded in the institution of the waqf, with its many practical manifestations of enacted justice in forms of social security, public health and other civic goods. , less is known about the destruction of the productive capacity of indigenous peoples, which served as a prelude to such land seizures. Equally, the army's determination to destroy the economic autonomy of local peoples -through strategies of surveillance and market control -has been understated. 37 Building on the work of Mahfoud Bennoune, Yves Gallisot, Samir Amin and Abdellatif Benachenhou, as precursors to the work of Settler Colonial Studies, this essay stresses the role played by the army in building this new world. 38 Bennoune, in particular, argued that the Conquest of Algeria was essentially driven by economic motives, including a desire for raw materials and markets for finished goods 39 , the extension of the monopolization of western Mediterranean trade which had already begun before 1830, along with royalist hostility to the fact that the Regency had made interest-free loans to
France in the Revolutionary period. 40 Critically, adopting a language quite familiar from settler colonial studies, Bennoune contended that:
Besides the military and political ramifications of this conquest, the introduction of capitalism, in its colonial form, involved the destruction of the pre-1830 socio-economic structures and patterns. This destruction was accompanied by a coercive pauperization and proletarianisation of the rural population and the development of a colonial agrarian capitalism. 41 As we shall see, this description of 'colonial agrarian capitalism' as that which replaced 'the destruction of the pre-1830 socio-economic structures and patterns' captures only part of the radical transformation of the world inflicted upon the peoples of Algeria.
A state of being Put most simply, in Algeria a state of being was replaced by the being of the state. Where lives had been experienced, they were now subordinated to the needs of the nascent state; a polity, which, as This is not to claim that lives before the Conquest had always been benign, nor that political power had always acted benevolently, yet a series of critical temporal and spatial shifts changed life in the early colony. A stasis of being was predicated on a perpetual present (assured by cosmic justice), quite different to the futurity of the temporal hierarchy of the man-made state, in which inhuman behaviour in the present could and should be excused by the progressive beneficence of an ideal of a better world to come. This should not be mistaken for the Orientalist description of the retarded and stagnant character of Muslim societies, for the state of being prized depth and accessing truths through reflective tradition, rather than the reimagination of the world. 42 Indeed, the Arabic concept of timelessness -khalid -can only really be understood as 'eternity' or 'immortality', substituting the sense of lack in 'timeless' or 'intemporel' with a sense of the temporal richness of being.
If the temporal character of the world became more variegated, spatially life became more restricted. Contrary to the beliefs of Europeans, who saw primitive peoples in Algeria as they did across the non-West, the old world had been one where life was both local and transnational. While the focus of living was grounded in the immediacy of known others, patterns of trade, governance and pilgrimage connected the lifeways of people across the Mediterranean and beyond. Critically, this space was assured by God, while the life of the nation state was directed by man. This secularity of the embryonic state has been curiously underestimated, perhaps because identifying the lacuna of religion in French archival sources depends on the recognition of their silences, rather than avowed programmes of action.
That which was destroyed was religious, whether we describe it as a Muslim or an Islamicate state. It was underwritten by quite distinct forms of ethics which stood in contradistinction to the morals of the new nation state. Where French governance was chiefly driven by the idea of beneficence (famously in the mission civilisatrice) and sometimes constrained by the brake of nonmaleficence, in the Islamic state complementary ethics of justice and autonomy sat alongside the Hippocratic injunctions to do good and not to do harm. 43 As Ahmed Bey wrote:
What are we to understand of their ambitions for our country, if they pretend that they have come here to modernise, to create a culture of justice and to suppress barbarism? Today, we reply that we are sure that the barbarism and the injustice which they practice are more hateful and detestable than any all the injustice and barbarism that has ever been known here. 44 
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For the Bey, where France was good and driven by destiny, the Algerian state was just and humble before God. Life was directed in the discernment of that which God would view as just, and while human life was imperfect, the aspiration to justice was not.
The individual was also autonomous for her relationship with God was personal, while, curiously, the reorientation of the self towards a relationship with the state played out economically as much as it did theologically, for the 'invisible hand' of both the market and God were replaced in a schema of national governance.
Bennoune was quite right to assert that colonial capitalism was regressive in its primarily agrarian character, for the destruction of urban nodes of exchange eliminated both ways of life and the capacity of transnational markets to supply the needs of populations across vast spaces. The centre assumed control of that which had been decentred, with the imposition of feudalism on a Muslim polity in a form reminiscent of the shift that had taken place in the newly European Spain of the sixteenth century. 'that we will profit from such actions, even with those who have been recalcitrant till now'. 53 The temporal character of this instrumental assault on indigenous peoples was made plain in his concluding remarks that 'Since such terrible work preserves our own future, let us hope that similar forms of devastation will not always need to be inflicted upon those who make our following such ; this 'vast edifice' being the new state of which both men dreamed. Crucially, the huge size of the standing army -more than 100,000 men in 1840 (by contrast, there were never more than 20,000 British soldiers in the much larger settler colonial space of Australia) -gave it 'unconstrained power' 57 , and the capacity to realise its dreams. As Bugeaud was to write to Soult in July 1842, 'We are not able to govern the Arabs and keep them in obedience through religious force or political sentiment. Force is therefore our principal form of government'.
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The argument of this article therefore draws on this stock of under-researched evidence, looking to connect elite policymaking with the mundane practices of empire-making. When, in 1842, Soult wrote to General Bugeaud 'Bit by bit, try to persuade the Arabs to accept our money', he was ordering the enaction of a policy at a very local level, but this was also expressive of a conceptual ideal which had been forged in Paris and Algiers. At both levels, it was expressive of the idea of slow violence, for the acceptance of French currency by intractable tribes could be recorded as evidence of their definitive defeat, whilst more generally it conveyed the idea of social incorporation or capture for all time, for once you began to trade in the currency of your enemy, you lay at the mercy of their management of your affairs in something which became a national economy. Bugeaud's Marxian insight into the symbolic power of money relations is mirrored across the thousands of routine and unremarkable sets of orders and notes which travelled around the nascent colony, in which we witness the spread of a cash nexus in which organic modes of exchange were replaced by the inorganic dominance of the monetary sign as economy replaced ecology.
Slow violence
The concept of slow violence requires a new analytic optic according to its originator, Rob Nixon. The razzia was judged by the French to be an acceptable form of warfare in Algeria; 'natural' in the sense that it accorded with the innate violence of the place (being notionally based on the Arabic ghāzwa 63 ), its people and their land, and in the manner in which it sought to impose European cultural and governmental control upon the harsh environment which sustained such 18 warring peoples. It was also presumed to be effective because it deployed violence in a communicative manner which purportedly made sense to the peoples of the Barbary Coast. The razzia's perfection lay in its timelessness in that it echoed historic forms of violence from the Maghreb, whilst destroying lives and livelihoods in its present, along with their future capacity for life.
Over time, the economic motive became imperative in such raids, for they combined the colonist's need to establish lines of communication and markets which could sustain the burdens imposed by the huge standing army, whilst at the same time degrading the ecological and economic capacity of France's enemies to live independent of imperial control. The amalgamation of such goals and strategies was made plain in a typical letter of June 1842 from Bugeaud to a commander in the field in which he laid out his goals for the campaigning season. 64 The Governor General began by setting out which territory the general ought to try to retain, focusing on the strategic town of Attlah, for if it was held 'it would offer security to the Metidja and the surrounds of Algiers, whilst opening up a degree of commerce which is so vital for this small town'. The mission's secondary aim was to 'introduce into Miliana and Médéa as much grain as possible, especially barley', with troops rewarded with the sum of 14 francs for every quintal (100lb) of barley and 20 francs for every quintal of wheat they brought to market. Such crops would not only sustain the army, but the control of their sale would help to establish an economic dominion, in a market in which prices could be reduced through the colonist's control of the supply of goods.
The degree to which the slow violence of the razzia was strategised and implemented across the colony is apparent in the ordinary records left behind by colonists, such as a report from the cercle d'Aumale from 15 July 1847. There, the local functionary, writing to his politico-military masters in Algiers, reported that 'the majority of the inhabitants have been able to pay their portion of the Zekkar tax'. 65 However, one tribe, the Beni Sala, were proving more obdurate. They had an 'undisciplined' 'character' and were not so 'submissive'. The occupier knew, nonetheless, that by this point power lay in his hands. The tribe were 'constrained by the fear of seeing their harvests destroyed' (note here the indirect verbal formulation). For this reason, the French knew that they would hasten to take their grain to secret mountain redoubts, which they considered to be unseizable. 'The report', again using forms of language which denied human agency, 'foresees that, in order to stymy their wicked plans, it will be necessary to offer them a severe lesson' [de leur donner un leçon sévère].
Here, then, the overarching temporality of the razzia was again made plain: in order to make a future which avoided the traps of the past, instructive violence would need to be administered in the present. Once this had been undertaken, the cercle d'Aumale would be more like that of Boghar, which had reported to the central authorities in the same sequence of reports, remarking that there had been 'a notable increase in trade with the tribes of the south as compared with previous years'. 66 One of the distinctive features of the Algerian settler colonial case was the degree to which the control of marketplaces lay central to the French project of slow violence. Writing more generally, Wolfe notes that:
Whatever settlers may say-and they generally have a lot to say-the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element. The Kabylia region, overpopulated and recalcitrant to central control, needed wheat products for subsistence; to that end it had to commercialize its oil and figs in the marketplaces of the Tell, and it became greatly dependent upon its relationship to this market. The tribes of the south also depended upon the market; there, they exchanged their wool, livestock and dates for grain and other items purchased in the fertile regions of the north.
[…] The marketplace, strategic as it was for exchange, was also instrumental in cementing social relationships for an otherwise dispersed and fragmented population.
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Mahfoud Bennoune noted the degree to which the French army saw the destruction and depopulation of urban centres as being critical to their military-economic goals, for such tactics also blunted the trading system of the entire country as urban markets ceased to function as efficient centres of exchange. As he noted, the population of Oran fell from 10,000 in 1830 to just 1,000 in 1832, while that of the capital halved in 1831. 69 The same was also true of the third-largest city in the region, as a colonial official had remarked in 1845:
Constantine is horrible to see; all buildings are falling in ruin, and half the houses that were there five years ago have been demolished. The indigenous population is in a terrifying state of misery and deprivation… by expelling the traders, by taking all sorts of violent measures, we have spread misery everywhere. 70 Reports of the success of such destructive policies were abundant across the period 1842-47
in which the submission of the Algerian as a producer was invariably paired with joyful descriptions of the bounty enjoyed by French soldiers in the deserts or the mountains of the place soldiers called 'the land of thirst' ('le pays de la soif').' 71 
Market control
Detailed accounts of the functioning of particular marketplaces can also help us to understand how the entry of indigenous peoples into national and international markets served to diminish both their physical capacity and their ability to exist in the new world of empire: the slow forms of oppression which, paired with the immediacy of the razzia, enjoined the demographic decline of the middle decades of the nineteenth century. 72 They are also revealing of the manner in which the state replaced a state of being.
One such report described the marketplace of the main square of Mascara in June 1842, in which:
The Arabs who come to our markets have been spending a great deal of money in the square. At first, they frequented the Moorish cafes, and then they bought a great number of cottons, silks, Indian fabrics, handkerchiefs and other materials, before acquiring foodstuffs such as sugar, coffee, salt and pepper. In general they went on to export many of the goods acquired in the market via merchants from Oran or Mostaganem.
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The writer went on to approvingly note that 'in general our markets are very busy', while in the last week it had been remarked that many more Arabs were in attendance than had been the case before. The manner in which this economic pacification could quickly morph into a tool of destitution was plain in the final section of the file in which it was reported that 'The Arabs receive a great deal of money for the farmyard animals which they hire to merchants who transport goods between Oran and Mostaganem'.
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In fact, the accompanying statistics reveal, the market rate for such services had tumbled from 120 francs an animal in January, to 100F in February, a rapid decline to 80F, then 60F, then 40F
in March, and 'now we pay only between 25F and 30F', with some rates falling as low as 20F. Even given the economic illiteracy of the age, we might ask how the writer of such a document could not understand that such a vertiginous fall in the value of indigenous assets evidently foretold an economic crisis. While it may have originally been the case that Arabs received 'a great deal of money' for such services, the writer does not reflect on how it had come to pass that the value of such animals had fallen sixfold in a matter of months. What was evidently key to him was the fact that 'now we pay only between 25F and 30F', for the alterity of the producer was lost in the joy of the consuming self, happy that the military-economic strategy of Soult and Bugeaud had so radically transformed the markets of the country in favour of the occupier.
The collapse in values at the market of Mascara in 1842 was mirrored in the movement of prices on a larger scale after the army's success in capturing the productive capacity of the country after 1845. Once the state was able to fix prices in the province of Algiers, the value of a metric quintal of wheat fell from 33 francs in 1856 to 22 francs in 1862, and 17.50 francs in 1865, while that of barley dropped from 19 francs to 13 francs to 9.50 francs across the same period. Indeed, Kitouni observes, this price setting constituted a form of 'double taxation', for a transaction charge was also applied to such trading, further enhancing the privation of local peoples, whilst from 1845 onwards taxes which had formerly been payable in goods were now demanded in monetary form, necessitating the sale of agricultural products at artificially low rates in markets and the added expense of incurring transport charges as goods were moved to designated trading centres.
More generally, Kitouni argues that historians have systematically underestimated the impact of French taxes (often invented using terminology in Arabic as a means of imputing a sheen of legitimacy to them-the ashour, zakat, hokor), fines, 'les tributs de guerre' and customs duties, and the degree to which they were conceived of as strategies of ruination. 74 The French had always 23 operated with an assumption that it was just that the costs of occupation should be shared between conqueror and conquered; a source, understandably, of as much resentment as almost any other feature of the annexation of Algeria.
Knowing the value of commodities was a step along the path to being able to control the cost of goods, which was a precondition of a ) and the fantasy of the tabula rasa, in which French generals and politicians dreamed that they might be able to inscribe a new world on the blank slate which was Algeria. As Moses and many others have observed, it was the idealism of this dream which often served as the wellspring of exterminatory ideas in print and in practice.
1847
Perhaps, then, we should look to 1847, rather than 1848, as marking a decisive moment in world history. Rather than focusing on failed European revolutions, we might consider the moment of victory of a transformative occupying force in Africa. Only the Sahara remained for France to conquer and the decades of frustration for the army, in which they had relentlessly sought to measure the population, the productive capacity of the land, the value of foods, prices across markets, and so on, were to be replaced by a world in which the costs of goods and services could now be fixed on a national level, with three-year plans setting prices for foodstuffs, the transport of goods and much else. 82 To control prices was to control both production and consumption, to command the lives of the peoples of the country, and to impose an absolute sense of order onto territories which had been frustratingly chaotic and sufficiently porous that forms of life which worked against the interests of the military state could thrive and survive.
Rey-Goldzeiguer's work on the 1850s and '60s described the manner in which many of the impoverished peoples of Algeria were left with no options but to migrate to the cities once the conquest had been completed, to towns where they would invariably be broken as dispensable cogs in the machine of a monopoly capitalism established without the welfarist safeguards which would emerge in Europe. 83 As Bennoune wrote:
Once the capitalist mode of production was introduced into Algeria it subjected all the preexisting socio-economic forms to the exigencies of capital accumulation for the benefit of the settlers, who, besides land capital, needed a free labour force. However, in order to work for the colonizers as share-croppers or wage-laborers, rural producers had to be expropriated; and the socio-economic organization of their respective communities had to be disintegrated and reorientated. 84 It is important to recognise that this movement of people and labour was far from an accidental consequence of empire, but was a strategic imperative for an army whose 'reorganization' of the 'vast edifice' of the nation depended on increasing productive capacity whilst reducing the costs of production.
We should not to be surprised that a consequence of this economic hegemony was the inability of the ecology, environment and economy to provide for people in times of want. The margins of existence, in times of drought or other 'natural' disasters, were now controlled in a scientific fashion by the state with little interest in replicating the survival mechanisms which had been built into traditional ecologies. Silos of grain hidden in the mountains could not be countenanced in this new world 85 , and as Ageron noted, glossed by Davis in his broader account of empire and capital's role in the creation of famines in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the value of goods and livestock actually tended to diminish at times when starvation was taking its hold on the population. While this may seem counterintuitive, for we would expect the cost of subsistence foodstuffs to rise at times when lives were threatened, colonial control of the economy had, as we have seen, been based upon the principle that the unit costs of labour and goods provided by the Indigènes should be relentlessly pushed down so as to make the colony 'pay for itself'.
As one report from the province of Oran had it in July 1847, 'the price of grains had reduced by a sensible amount' -for the consuming Self could never imagine the consequences of such shifts 28 in the market upon producing Others. 86 In situations such as the famines of the late 1860s, it therefore seems unsurprising to see rapid falls in the price of goats and other subsistence farm animals, for Algerians found themselves caught between a colonial economic system in which value was determined by low prices (with, as we have seen, rapid falls in value interpreted as being of universal benefit) and European traders and markets who were able to relentlessly exploit the need of people on the margins of life to sell the only goods they possessed. In their new world, women and men now interacted with each other in novel ways, for we might say that the Hegelian sense of thymos disappeared as Algerians became ghosts in their own land. Rather than the modern state conferring universal Platonic dignity, it removed a system of godly universal esteem and the lived manifestations of justice which served as the bases of society.
Plato suggested that the thymotic urge -the desire of humans to look into the eyes of the Other and to see respect -drove political change, yet in imperial situations such as Algeria, it was the negation of such a culture of respect which was engineered by the colonial state. The aspiration of Algerians
